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Private, voluntary arbitration is employed widely in the United
States.' Arbitration occurs when parties agree to adjudicate a dispute
before a neutral decisionmaker who is neither a judge nor an adminis-
trative official.2 Parties to a dispute can enter into an ad hoc agree-
ment to arbitrate once a dispute has arisen, or they can enter into a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement in which they agree in advance to
submit to arbitration disputes that may subsequently arise. In either
case, arbitration agreements are contracts, and parties are free to
agree on whatever procedural and substantive rules they wish to have
applied toward the resolution of their dispute." This means that parties
can either create their own arbitration rules and select their own arbi-
trators or agree to submit their disputes to an arbitration organization
that has existing procedures and panels of arbitrators.6 Regardless of
the system to which parties ultimately agree, they will be bound by the
arbitrator's decision.!
Historically, courts were hostile to arbitration agreements and of-
ten refused to enforce them.8 In 1925, however, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")9 "to reverse the longstanding judi-
cial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English
common law and had been adopted by American courts.' '. The FAA
treats arbitration agreements as being as enforceable as any other
t B.A. 1997, Carleton College; J.D. 2002, The University of Chicago.
I See Leonard L. Riskin and James E. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers 503-04
(West 2d ed 1997) (collecting sources outlining the use of private arbitration in a wide variety of
contexts).
2 See id at 502.
3 See id.
4 See First Options of Chicago Inc v Kaplan, 514 US 938, 943 (1995) ("[A]rbitration is
simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes ... that the
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.").
5 See Riskin and Westbrook, Dispute Resolution at 502 (cited in note 1) ("Private arbitra-
tion systems are diverse because one of the features of private arbitration is that the parties have
considerable freedom in designing the process and providing the substantive standards used by
the arbitrator in making a decision.").
6 See id at 502-03.
7 See id at 502.
8 See id at 515.
9 Pub L No 68-401,43 Stat 883 (1925), codified as amended at 9 USC § 1 et seq (2000).
10 Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20,24 (1991).
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contract" and orders federal district courts to compel arbitration when
one party has failed, neglected, or refused to comply with an arbitra-
tion agreement.
Despite this "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments,"13 a party who is ostensibly bound by an arbitration agreement
but wishes not to have a dispute arbitrated may be able to obtain re-
lief from a federal district court." This relief can be sought either prior
to the arbitration as an action to avoid the arbitration completely (and
have the underlying dispute resolved by a court),' or after the arbitra-
tion as an action to change any decision made by the arbitrator.'
6
Whether a court permits a party to challenge an arbitration agreement
before or after the arbitration proceeding has important consequences
for both parties. Allowing challenges in court prior to arbitration
opens the floodgates to litigation, thus defeating the purpose of enter-
ing into an arbitration agreement in the first place." On the other
hand, requiring a party to wait until after arbitration is complete to
raise a challenge in court forces that party to participate in a proceed-
ing to which they may not have validly agreed to submit."
Whether relief can be sought in court before or after the arbitra-
tion hearing generally depends on the type of challenge raised. Fed-
eral district courts have entertained challenges prior to the com-
mencement of arbitration based on ordinary contract principles such
as lack of consideration, unconscionability, and the adhesion contract
doctrine.'9 In addition, when the underlying dispute involves the fed-
eral statutory rights of one of the parties, federal courts have heard
challenges prior to arbitration based on that party's inability to vindi-
cate its statutory rights effectively through arbitration.20
11 See 9 USC § 2 ("[Arbitration agreements] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.').
12 See 9 USC § 4 (stating that if a valid arbitration agreement exists with which one party
has not complied, "the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms" of the agreement).
13 Gilmer, 500 US at 25, quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construc-
tion Corp, 460 US 1,24 (1983).
14 The FAA does not grant general subject matter jurisdiction over disputes involving arbi-
tration agreements. Thus, there must be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as di-
versity. See Moses H. Cone, 460 US at 25 n 32 ("[The FAA] creates a body of federal substantive
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not cre-
ate any independent federal question jurisdiction.... [T]here must be diversity of citizenship or
some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction.').
15 See 9 USC §§ 2, 4 (outlining procedures for determining whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists).
16 See 9 USC § 10 (outlining procedures for vacatur of an arbitration award).
17 See Part II.B.3.
18 See Part II.A.3.
19 See Part II.A.1.
20 See Part II.A.2.
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On the other hand, two types of challenges to arbitration agree-
ments may be raised only after arbitration has been completed and a
decision rendered. These two challenges are attacks on the actual arbi-
tration based on "evident partiality" of the arbitrator' and "funda-
mental unfairness" of the arbitration.2
Parties to an arbitration agreement may also attempt to challenge
the agreement based on institutional bias of the chosen arbitration
system. Institutional bias challenges allege the general tendency of an
arbitration forum to find consistently in favor of one type of partici-
pant over another, for example, employers over employees.2 Unlike
challenges to arbitration based on contract principles or an inability to
vindicate statutory rights, which may be brought prior to arbitration,
or those based on "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness,"
which may only be brought post-arbitration, it is unclear whether in-
stitutional bias challenges may properly be raised before or after arbi-
tration. On first impression it may seem that such challenges better
match with the "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness" chal-
lenges that can only be raised post-arbitration. This Comment argues,
however, that the actual best fit is with those challenges that can be
raised prior to arbitration, and that institutional bias challenges should
be heard before arbitration commences.
Part I explains and gives examples of institutional bias challenges
that have been leveled against various arbitration systems as well as
the current conflict regarding proper timing of such challenges. Part II
explains the timing of other types of challenges to arbitration and the
justifications for the different timing allowances. Part II.A describes
those challenges that may be brought prior to arbitration, and Part
II.B describes those challenges that may be brought only after arbitra-
tion. Finally, Part III compares institutional bias challenges to those
challenges discussed in Part II and concludes that courts should enter-
tain institutional bias challenges prior to arbitration.
I. INSTITUTIONAL BIAS CHALLENGES
A. Examples of Institutional Bias Allegations
"Institutional bias" is a phrase often invoked but rarely defined.2 '
With respect to arbitration organizations, the term generally refers to
21 See Part II.B.1.
22 See Part I.B.2.
23 See Part I.
24 An electronic search of the ALLFEDS database in Westlaw revealed 144 federal cases
using the term "institutional bias," but the term is not found in West's Federal Practice Words
and Phrases Digest. See Federal Practice Digest 4th:Words and Phrases H-K (West 1999 & Supp
2001).
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a tendency for arbitration outcomes to favor one class of participants
over another. The bias is considered institutional because the causes of
the unbalanced outcomes may be widely diffused throughout the en-
tire arbitral system.
Both commentators and litigants have leveled charges of institu-
tional bias against various arbitration organizations. Consider, for ex-
ample, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"). ICANN's uniform dispute resolution policy governs dis-
putes between domain name registrants and trademark holders with
whose trademark the domain name may interfere Two independent
studies of ICANN's resolution system indicate that trademark holders
have a statistical advantage over registrants in arbitration. Under
ICANN's resolution system, only trademark holders may launch com-
plaints.2 The trademark holder brings a complaint with one of four ar-
bitration companies, paying a fee of approximately $1,500.2 Thus, it is
in the arbitration providers' best interests to favor trademark holders
in order to attract their business in the future. Studies by Milton Muel-
ler at Syracuse University and Michael Geist at the University of Ot-
tawa confirm this suspicion, finding two major areas where bias is evi-
dent in the system.
First, when trademark holders are allowed to choose the arbitra-
tion company, they engage in significant forum shopping, bringing
most cases to companies that tend to find in favor of the complain-
ant9 Notably, following the publication of Mueller's report, the arbi-
25 See ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available online at
<http:lwww.icann.orgludrpludrp.htm> (visited July 5, 2002). This system is not identical to the
traditional pre-dispute arbitration agreement in which both parties to a potential dispute agree
to submit to mandatory arbitration (as in an employment context, for example, where employer
and employee both sign the arbitration agreement). In this case, the domain name registrant
signs an agreement with a registration company. The registrant agrees to submit to arbitration
disputes with trademark holders who are not signatories to the registration agreement. See, for
example, DomainRegistry.com Inc. Domain Registration Form, available online at <https://
www.domainregistry.com/register/index.html> (visited July 5,2002) ("By submitting this registra-
tion, you acknowledge, accept, and agree, that you understand the following: ... Registrant
agrees that if the registration of its domain name is challenged by any third party, the Registrant
will be subject to the provisions specified in the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Reso-
lution Policy.").
26 See Kim Honey, Master of His Domain, The Globe and Mail R1 (Aug 22,2001) (describ-
ing studies performed by Milton Mueller at Syracuse University's Convergence Center and Mi-




30 Geist found that WIPO, one of the arbitration organizations, attracted 58 percent of
cases and decided in favor of the trademark holders 82 percent of the time. See id. Geist also
found that 90 percent of trademark holders choose the two arbitration providers that render the
most pro-complainant decisions. See Michael Geist, How Bias Besets Domain Cases, The Globe
and Mail B12 (Aug 23,2001).
1986 [69:1983
Institutional Bias Challenges
tration organization with the smallest statistically significant market
share and the largest propensity for deciding in favor of registrants
saw a drop in business as trademark holders took their complaints to
the two organizations that appeared most favorable to complainants.3'
Second, within the arbitration companies the selection process
for arbitrators appears biased in favor of trademark holders. Disputes
are heard by either a panel of three arbitrators selected by the parties
or a single arbitrator chosen by the arbitration provider.' When a
panel of arbitrators hears the case, trademark holders prevail about 60
percent of the time.3 When a single arbitrator chosen by the arbitra-
tion provider hears it, that figure jumps to 83 percent? This bias may
result from the fact that although assignment of single arbitrators is
supposed to be random, it in fact is not.
Litigants have leveled similar charges against various other arbi-
tration organizations. The New York Stock Exchange arbitration sys-
tem has been accused of being dominated by the securities industry
such that in disputes between firms and individuals, the firms "selec[t]
the entire arbitrator pool, appoin[t] the individual arbitration panels,
and mak[e] important procedural and discovery decisions.' ' 6 The Na-
tional Grain & Feed Association ("NGFA") arbitration system has
also been accused of structural bias in that NGFA members serve as
arbitrators, placing farmers "in the unenviable position of having to at-
tempt to persuade NGFA members that a widespread practice of the
association's membership is illegal."37
31 See Honey, Master of His Domain, The Globe and Mail at R1 (cited in note 26). Com-
mentators have criticized this repeat-player problem in other dispute resolution systems, such as
compulsory arbitration of employment disputes. See, for example, Richard A. Bales, Compulsory
Arbitration: The Grand Experiment in Employment 128 (Cornell 1997). Bales notes two prob-
lems arising from the fact that employers who often participate in arbitration face employees
who are unlikely to have encountered arbitration before or to encounter it again. First, if the par-
ties are given a choice of arbitrators, a repeat-player employer is likely to have more and better
information about the arbitrators, allowing it to make a favorable selection. See id. Second, the
knowledge that an employer is more likely than an employee to hire an arbitrator in the future
may consciously or subconsciously induce the arbitrator to favor the employer. See id.




35 See id. Geist cites as an example the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"). Although
the NAF has 135 arbitrators, 53 percent of cases are heard by just six of them. These six arbitra-
tors rule in favor of trademark holders 94 percent of the time. See id. See also Honey, Master of
his Domain, The Globe and Mail at R1 (cited in note 26) (noting that Mueller, an outspoken
critic of the ICANN process, has been on one of the provider's lists of potential arbitrators for
two years and has never been assigned to a case on his own).
36 Rosenberg v Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc, 995 F Supp 190, 211 (D Mass
1998), affd 163 F3d 53 (1st Cir 1998), vacd by 1999 US App LEXIS 7793 (Ist Cir), substituted
opinion at 170 F3d 1 (lst Cir 1999).
37 Harter v Iowa Grain Co, 220 F3d 544,554 (7th Cir 2000), quoting Brief for Appellants I
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B. Circuit Split Over Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges
Given that there is legitimate controversy about the institutional
bias of various arbitration organizations, the question becomes when
and how a party who has signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
can challenge what it perceives to be an arbitration forum structurally
biased in its opponent's favor. Courts are split on this question.
The Seventh Circuit has found that institutional bias claims must
be postponed until the completion of arbitration. In Smith v American
Arbitration Association, Inc,3 a woman contracted to sell her control-
ling interest in a corporation for $65 million. ' As part of the contract,
she agreed to submit disputes to arbitration.40 When a dispute subse-
quently arose, the woman alleged that the arbitration system was bi-
ased because it made it easy for an all-male panel to be selected that
would presumably be unsympathetic to her." The court called her
challenge "premature," indicating that she could challenge the arbitra-
tion after proceedings were complete.4 2 The court reasoned that by
placing an arbitration clause in their contract, the parties chose to
trade certain procedural safeguards for savings in time and expense.43
One of the procedural safeguards given up was the power to challenge
bias of the arbitration prior to the arbitral resolution of the dispute."
Thus, the Seventh Circuit stated, "[t]he time to challenge an arbitra-
tion, on whatever grounds, including bias, is when the arbitration is
completed and an award rendered.""
On the other hand, two other circuit courts have indicated that
there may be cases in which, prior to arbitration, a party could demon-
strate structural bias to an extent that the court would refuse to com-
pel arbitration. For example, in Floss v Ryan's Family Steak Houses,
Inc,' employees tried to bring suit against their employer under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 7
As part of their employment contracts, however, the employees had
signed arbitration agreements.4 In attempting to avoid arbitration, the
employees argued that the arbitration procedures were biased in their
at 32.
38 233 F3d 502 (7th Cir 2000).
39 See id at 504.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 Id at 506.
43 See id.
44 See id at 506-07.
45 Id at 506.
46 211 F3d 306 (6th Cir 2000).




employer's favor." The Sixth Circuit ultimately refused to compel ar-
bitration on other grounds.5 The court implied, however, that if there
had not been other grounds for its decision, it would have considered
the potential bias prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration.'
Thus it appears that the Sixth Circuit would hear certain institutional
bias claims prior to arbitration.
Likewise, the First Circuit indicated that it would hear certain
bias claims prior to arbitration. In Rosenberg v Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc,2 the plaintiff alleged "structural infirmities" in
the arbitration system that would hear her Title VII and ADEA com-
plaints against her employer." Although the court compelled arbitra-
tion in that case, it did so because the evidence did not sufficiently es-
tablish bias. q The First Circuit is therefore receptive to hearing certain
institutional bias challenges prior to arbitration, as well as receptive to
potentially refusing to compel arbitration in cases in which that bias
can be sufficiently established. It noted that "[p]laintiffs are not re-
quired to take their claims to biased panels or through biased proce-
dures.""
At first glance, institutional bias challenges may appear to be no
different from "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness" chal-
lenges that parties may only raise after an arbitration proceeding.
However, on further examination of the challenges that parties may
raise before and after arbitration, institutional bias challenges appear
to present a better fit, both in substance and in underlying justifica-
tion, with those challenges raised prior to a proceeding.
II. TIMING OF ARBITRATION CHALLENGES GENERALLY
Although the proper timing of institutional bias challenges to ar-
bitration is currently unclear, the law is fairly settled with respect to
the timing of other types of challenges. Two types of challenges are
permitted prior to arbitration. First, allegations that the arbitration
agreement is not valid based on general contract principles are heard
49 See id at 313-14.
50 See id at 314 (invalidating the arbitration contract on the grounds that the promise to
provide an arbitral forum was too vague and therefore illusory, and hence could not provide con-
sideration for the contract).
51 See id ("Though we have concerns with ... the ... potential bias of [employer's] arbitral
forum, we need not decide whether these deficits prevent the arbitration of [employee's] statu-
tory claims.").
52 170 F3d 1 (1st Cir 1999).
53 Id at 14 (noting that the plaintiff had claimed that the arbitrator was governed by the
defendant).
54 See id at 16. Once the court found there was not sufficient evidence of bias, it then found
that Merrill Lynch had not satisfied its obligations under the arbitration contract. See id at 20.
55 Id at 16.
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pre-arbitration. Courts cannot compel parties to submit to an arbitra-
tion to which they did not agree. Thus, prior to compelling arbitration,
a court must determine that the arbitration agreement is a valid con-
tract. Second, allegations that the arbitration will not allow effective
vindication of statutory rights are also heard pre-arbitration. Resolu-
tion of disputes involving statutory rights has an element of public in-
terest to it. Whether one citizen is able to vindicate his statutory rights
in any given situation is a matter of concern to all citizens. Thus, fed-
eral courts may, prior to arbitration, entertain arguments that arbitra-
tion would not allow for vindication of statutory rights.
Two other types of challenges to arbitration can be brought only
after the completion of an arbitration proceeding. First, a party can
challenge the proceeding based on the "evident partiality" of the arbi-
trator. This challenge means that a court can vacate an arbitration
award if there is a reasonable impression that the arbitrator was bi-
ased. Second, a party can challenge an arbitration based on the "fun-
damental unfairness" of the proceedings. This challenge allows a court
to vacate an award if the arbitration lacked some fundamental ele-
ments of fairness such as notice and an opportunity to be heard. These
challenges are permitted only after the completion of arbitration for
several reasons including respect for the arbitration agreement, and
the difficulty in establishing partiality or unfairness of a proceeding
before the proceeding has taken place.
A. Challenges Prior to Arbitration
Challenges prior to arbitration generally take the form of a de-
fense to a motion to compel arbitration. The party seeking to arbitrate
the underlying dispute brings the motion to compel. They may bring it
either as part of a motion to dismiss or stay federal court proceedings
if the other party brings the underlying dispute to federal court,n or as
an independent action when the opposing party simply refuses to
submit to arbitration.?
56 See, for example, Hurlbut v Gantshar, 674 F Supp 385, 386 (D Mass 1987). In Hurlbut,
plaintiff investor brought suit in federal court against her broker alleging various acts stemming
from mismanagement of her account. See id. The broker then sought to stay the proceedings and
compel arbitration based on the fact that plaintiff had signed an agreement to arbitrate any dis-
putes when she opened her account. See id at 387.
57 See, for example, Associated Brick Mason Contractors of Greater New York, Inc v
Harrington, 820 F2d 31, 34 (2d Cir 1987). In that case, the employer brought an action in district
court to compel arbitration after the union failed to submit to the employer's demand for arbi-
tration. See id. The union responded by challenging the arbitration, arguing, among other things,
that the underlying dispute was outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id at 34-35.
See also Prima Paint Corp v Flood and Conklin Manufacturing Co, 388 US 395,404 (1967) (not-
ing that federal district courts' review of challenges to arbitration agreements does not vary de-
pending on which party originally invoked the assistance of the court).
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Challenges based on general contract principles are premised on
the FAA.' Pre-arbitration review of such challenges are justified on
two grounds." First, an arbitrator lacks authority to adjudicate a dis-
pute absent a valid contractual agreement to arbitrate. Second, waiting
until after an arbitration has been completed adds nothing to the de-
termination of whether there was a valid arbitration agreement.
Challenges based on an inability to vindicate statutory rights are
premised on a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Mitsubishi
Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,6 which held that statu-
tory rights may be arbitrated so long as those rights can be adequately
enforced.61 Pre-arbitration review of these challenges is justified on the
grounds that the public has an interest in supplying an adequate fo-
rum for the enforcement of statutory rights and that post-arbitration
review is an insufficient check on this forum.62
1. Challenges based on general contract principles.
Section 2 of the FAA indicates that an agreement to arbitrate be-
tween two parties "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."' Thus, when a dispute arises between parties who are
bound by an arbitration agreement, a party may challenge the agree-
ment on general contract principles, arguing that the agreement is
void and that the underlying dispute does not have to be arbitrated.
For example, federal courts have invalidated arbitration clauses based
on lack of consideraton,6 unconscionability," and the adhesion con-
tract doctrine.6 Applicable state law supplies the contract principles a
party may use to invalidate agreements to arbitrate, provided, how-
ever, that the laws are general in nature and not aimed specifically at
arbitration clauses." Arbitration agreements are thus placed "upon the
same footing as other contracts."
58 See Part II.A.1.
59 See Part II.A.3.
60 473 US 614 (1985).
61 See id at 625-26; Part II.A.2.
62 See Part II.A.3.
63 9 USC § 2.
64 See, for example, Hull v Norcom, Inc, 750 F2d 1547,1550 (11th Cir 1985) (invalidating an
arbitration agreement in which only one party was obligated to submit controversies to arbitra-
tion).
65 See, for example, Geiger v Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, 134 F Supp 2d 985,999 (S D
Ind 2001) (invalidating as unconscionable an arbitration agreement whose rights and obligations
defendant had misrepresented and plaintiff had misunderstood).
66 See, for example, Ticknor v Choice Hotels International, Inc, 265 F3d 931, 939-41 (9th
Cir 2001) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a pre-printed standard form
agreement drafted by one party).
67 See Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681,686-87 (1996):
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An arbitration agreement is often not a stand-alone contract be-
tween two parties, but rather a short clause inserted in a much broader
contract such as a contract for sale of goods or an employment
agreement.69 Under Section 4 of the FAA, a federal district court must
grant a motion to compel arbitration once it is "satisfied that the mak-
ing of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not an issue."7" This section has been interpreted to mean that chal-
lenges to arbitration agreements based on general contract doctrines
must be made to the arbitration clause specifically, and not the
broader contract generally.7' The Supreme Court explains with an ex-
ample:
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself-an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to ar-
bitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the
statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally7
These latter claims of general contract validity are left for determina-
tion through the arbitration.7
2. Challenges based on inability to vindicate statutory rights.
A second type of challenge to an arbitration agreement that may
be raised prior to arbitration arises when the underlying dispute in-
volves the federal statutory rights of one of the parties. Disputes by
parties who are bound by arbitration agreements frequently involve
rights under Title VII,74 the Truth in Lending Act,7 and civil RICO
[S]tate law may be applied if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revo-
cability, and enforceability of contracts generally. Thus, generally applicable contract de-
fenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionabiity, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA]. Courts may not, however, invalidate ar-
bitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.
(citations omitted).
68 Id at 687, quoting Scherk vAlberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506,511 (1974).
69 See, for example, Prima Paint Corp v Flood and Conklin Manufacturing Co, 388 US 395,
398 (1967) (involving a consulting contract containing the following arbitration clause: "Any con-
troversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [consulting contract], or the breach thereo,
shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York, in accordance with the rules then obtain-
ing of the American Arbitration Association.').
70 9USC § 4.
71 See Prima Paint Corp, 388 US at 403-04 (holding that a federal court may consider only
issues relating to the making or performance of the arbitration clause when determining whether
to compel arbitration under 9 USC § 4).
72 Id at 403-04.
73 See id at 406 (noting that the issue of fraud in making the entire contract, of which the
arbitration agreement was a part, was an issue for arbitration).
74 See, for example, Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36 (1974) (involving a Title
VII employment discrimination claim made by an employee who was party to an arbitration
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statutes. 6 The Supreme Court recently affirmed the possibility of arbi-
trating such disputes based on statutory rights," noting that "claims
arising under a statute designed to further important social policies
may be arbitrated 'so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum."''
This language opens the door to allow a party to escape arbitration of
a dispute involving statutory rights by claiming that the arbitral forum
does not allow effective vindication of those rights. Some federal
courts have been receptive to this argument.
For example, in Graham Oil Co v Arco Products Co, the Ninth
Circuit overturned a lower court's dismissal of a dispute that was os-
tensibly governed by an arbitration agreement.8 The dispute involved
a gasoline distribution agreement between an oil producer and a dis-
tributor.1 These relationships are normally governed by the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"),n which grants parties to a distri-
bution agreement particular benefits such as the right to recover ex-
emplary damages and attorneys' fees.n The arbitration clause at issue
in Graham Oil, which covered "any dispute or controversy relating to
or arising out of the agreement," forfeited several of these rights."
The court noted that nothing prevents parties from arbitrating statu-
tory rights generally and that rights under the PMPA could be submit-
ted to arbitration.! In this case, however, the court found that the arbi-
tration agreement, in forfeiting statutory benefits, violated both the
purpose and the specific terms of the PMPA."
agreement with his employer).
75 See, for example, Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph, 531 US 79 (2000) (in-
volving claims under the Truth in Lending Act made by borrower against her lender where the
financing agreement included an arbitration clause).
76 See, for example, Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220 (1987) (in-
volving civil RICO claims asserted against a brokerage firm by its customers who had signed cus-
tomer agreements that contained arbitration clauses).
77 See Green Tree, 531 US at 84 (holding that a party's claims under Truth in Lending Act
and Equal Credit Opportunity Act were subject to arbitration agreement). See also Gilmer v In-
terstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20,26 (1991) ("It is by now clear that statutory claims may
be the subject of an arbitration agreement.").
78 Green Tree, 531 US at 90, quoting Mitsubishi, 473 US at 637. See also Mitsubishi, 473 US
at 628 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum.").
79 43 F3d 1244 (9th Cir 1995).
8o See id at 1246.
81 See id.
82 15 USC § 2801 et seq (2000).
83 See Graham Oil, 43 F3d at 1247.
84 Id at 1249 (appendix).
85 See id at 1247.
86 See id.
87 See id at 1248.
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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has refused to compel arbitration
of a dispute involving the statutory fights of one of the parties. In
Paladino v Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc, an employer attempted
to compel arbitration after an employee filed a Title VII claim." The
arbitration agreement covered "any controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to [the] employment," but indicated that the arbitrator
was authorized only to award damages for breach of contract and had
"no authority whatsoever to make an award of other damages."" This
limitation on damages would have precluded any possibility of receiv-
ing Title VII damages in the arbitration, and was thus "fundamentally
at odds with the purposes of Title VII."9' The court, therefore, did not
compel arbitration of the employee's Title VII claims because she
would not be able to vindicate effectively her statutory claims in the
arbitral forum in the absence of the arbitrator's authority to award
any damages for Title VII violations.2
3. Justifications for allowing challenges prior to arbitration.
The fact that challenges to arbitration based on contractual
grounds are heard prior to arbitration is based on the text of Section 2
of the FAA." Because arbitration is a matter of contract, the authority
of an arbitrator to resolve disputes arises only from the agreement of
the parties." Before a reluctant party can be forced to submit to arbi-
tration, it must be judicially determined that the parties have contrac-
tually agreed to be so bound.9 This inquiry should occur prior to arbi-
tration for two reasons. First, arbitrators have no authority to hear
disputes absent a valid arbitration agreement. Second, the outcome of
such an inquiry does not depend on what happens during the arbitra-
tion. Unlike challenges to arbitration based on "evident partiality" or
"fundamental unfairness," which attack the arbitration proceeding it-
self,; contractual challenges to the arbitration agreement rely solely
88 134 F3d 1054 (11th Cir 1998).
89 See id at 1056.
90 Id.
91 Id at 1060.
92 See id.
93 See 9 USC § 2 (stating that an agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract").
94 See AT&T Technologies, Inc v Communications Workers of America, 475 US 643,648-49
("[A]rbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in
advance to submit such grievances to arbitration').
95 See Sydnor v Conseco Financial Servicing Corp, 252 F3d 302,305 (4th Cir 2001) ("Con-
gress did not intend for the FAA to force parties who had not agreed to arbitrate into a non-
judicial forum, and therefore, federal courts must first decide whether the parties entered into an
agreement to arbitrate their disputes.").
96 See Part H.B.3.
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on events unrelated to the arbitration proceeding. Contractual chal-
lenges focus on whether there was a valid contractual agreement to
arbitrate.
Challenges based on the inability to vindicate statutory rights ef-
fectively are not derived directly from the FAA. Instead, these chal-
lenges are based on a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, in-
cluding Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp and Mitsubishi.n The
treatment of statutory rights is different because of the public interest
in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights-an interest that is
separate from private parties' interest in resolving a dispute between
themselves.9 In order for these rights to be submitted to arbitration,
the arbitration must allow effective vindication of them. Any arbitra-
tion of a statutory claim that did not allow for effective vindication of
rights would "conflict[] with the statute's purpose of both providing
individual relief and generally deterring unlawful conduct through the
enforcement of its provisions.""
While in some cases post-arbitration judicial review could be suf-
ficient to ensure effective vindication of statutory rights,'°1 in at least
some cases such post-arbitration review would not be sufficient. For
example, in Cole v Burns International Security Services,in the D.C.
Circuit placed importance on the fact that an arbitration agreement
required a written opinion when it determined that the arbitration at
issue would allow effective vindication of Title VII claims.' Presuma-
bly, post-arbitration judicial review of a proceeding that had resulted
in no written opinion would be impossible, and thus would not offer
adequate protection of statutory rights. In such cases, challenges alleg-
ing that arbitration would not allow effective vindication of statutory
rights must be heard pre-arbitration.
97 500 US 20 (1991).
98 See note 78 and accompanying text.
99 See Cole v Burns International Security Services, 105 F3d 1465,1476 (DC Cir 1997) (stat-
ing that "a private agreement to arbitrate statutory claims" does not only affect the private par-
ties, rather "there is a public interest in the manner in which the external-law norms are articu-
lated and applied in the arbitral forum"), quoting Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment
Disputes without Unions, 66 Chi Kent L Rev 753,777 (1990).
100 Floss, 211 F3d 306, 313 (6th Cir 2000) (holding that the arbitration agreement between
employer and employees was unenforceable because the employees received no consideration
for their promise to submit disputes to arbitration).
101 See Gilmer, 500 US at 30-31, 32 n 4 (noting that plaintiff had failed to show that post-
arbitration review would be inadequate to guard against bias that would preclude effective vin-
dication of his claims under the ADEA).
102 105 F3d 1465 (DC Cir 1997).
103 See id at 1482.
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B. Challenges Following Arbitration
Section 10 of the FAA sets out the situations in which a party
may challenge an arbitration award after the arbitration has been
completed. 5 An arbitration award may be vacated if it was procured
by corruption or fraud, or there was bias or misconduct in the arbitra-
tion."' In addition, several courts have endorsed the extra-statutory
ground of "fundamental unfairness" for vacating an arbitrationaward.'O
Post-arbitration review of these types of challenges is justified on
two main grounds. 5 First, the text of Section 10 lists vacatur of an ar-
bitration award as the only remedy. Second, determining whether
there was individual bias or unfairness in a proceeding requires that
the proceeding has actually taken place.
1. Vacatur based on "evident partiality" of the arbitrator.
Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA indicates that a federal district court
may vacate an arbitration award if there was "evident partiality" in
the arbitrator or arbitrators.I" The text of Section 10 implies that "evi-
dent partiality" must be shown by proof of actual bias, a rather high
threshold. 5 The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "evident
partiality" in Commonwealth Coatings Corp v Continental Casualty
Co. " In that case, a plurality of four justices found that arbitrators
must avoid "even the appearance of bias" under the FAA.' However,
while two other justices concurred in the result, they did not subscribe
to the same "appearance of bias" standard as the plurality.12 As the
104 See 9 USC §§ 10(a)(1)-(4).
105 See id.
106 See, for example, Hoffman v Cargill, Inc, 59 F Supp 2d 861,891-95 (N D Iowa 1999) (dis-
cussing the "fundamental unfairness" approach), revd 236 F3d 458 (8th Cir 2001) (finding that
the facts did not meet the legal standard). See also Part 11.B.2. This type of review looks only to
the "fundamental unfairness" of the proceedings, not the "fundamental unfairness" of any de-
termination or award by the arbitration panel. Hoffrnan, 59 F Supp 2d at 892.
107 See Part II.B.3.
108 9USC§10(a)(2).
109 See Morelite Construction Corp v New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F2d 79, 84 (2d Cir 1984) (noting that the literal words of Section 10 suggest an actual
bias standard, a standard it called "difficult, and indeed often impossible" to meet). See also
Merit Insurance Co v Leatherby Insurance Co, 714 F2d 673, 681 (7th Cir 1983) ("Read literally,
[Section 10(a)(2)] would require proof of actual bias.").
110 393 US 145 (1968) (vacating an award rendered in an arbitration between a prime con-
tractor and a subcontractor where one of the three arbitrators had a significant undisclosed
business relationship with the prime contractor, despite the fact that there was no allegation of
actual bias or fraud on the part of the arbitrator).
111 Id at 150.
112 Id at 150-52 (White concurring) (noting that arbitrators should not be held to the same
standards of judicial decorum as Article III judges, and that a business relationship between an
arbitrator and a party should not result in automatic disqualification).
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Second Circuit noted, "much of [the plurality's] opinion must be read
as dicta, and we are left in the dark as to whether an 'appearance of
bias' will suffice to meet the seemingly more stringent 'evident partial-
ity' standard of 9 U.S.C. § o.
''"13
In navigating these murky waters, several circuit courts have
adopted a standard somewhere between an "appearance of bias"
standard and the "actual bias" standard that the text of Section 10 im-
plies."' This intermediate standard was expressly formulated by the
Second Circuit in Morelite Construction Corp v New York City District
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds:"-' "[W]e hold that 'evident partial-
ity' within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reason-
able person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to
one party to the arbitration.""6 In that case, the court vacated an
award made in an arbitration in which the arbitrator's father was a
vice president of an international union of which one party was a
member."'
7
At least two circuits have expressly adopted the Second Circuit's
Morelite formulation."g Additionally, three other circuits have adopted
a remarkably similar approach. Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
use a "reasonable impression of partiality" standard to evaluate claims
of evident partiality under Section 10. ' The Seventh Circuit also has
indicated that an arbitrator who "might reasonably be suspected of
partiality" could be disqualified under Section 10(a)(2)."
Under Section 10 therefore, a federal court may vacate an arbi-
tration award if there was partiality on the part of the arbitrator. In
examining whether there was partiality sufficient to vacate an award
113 Morelite Construction Corp, 748 F2d at 83.
114 See, for example, id at 83-84 (reading "Section 10(b) as requiring a showing of some-
thing more than the mere 'appearance of bias' to vacate an arbitration award," while recognizing
that "a standard for partiality as insurmountable as 'proof of actual bias'-as the literal words of
Section 10 might suggest," would not be practical).
115 748 F2d 79 (2d Cir 1984).
116 Id at 84.
117 See id ("We know nothing more about the relationship between Patrick Campbell, Jr.
and Patrick Campbell, Sr. except that the former is the latter's son .... We cannot in good con-
science allow the entering of an award grounded in what we perceive to be such unfairness.").
118 See Peoples Security Life Insurance Co v Monumental Life Insurance Co, 991 F2d 141,
146 (4th Cir 1993) (stating that a plaintiff "must show that 'a reasonable person would [ ] con-
clude that an arbitrator was partial' to the other party to the arbitration"), quoting Apperson v
Fleet Carrier Corp, 879 F2d 1344,1358 (6th Cir 1989) (citing Morelite).
119 Scott v Prudential Securities, Inc, 141 F3d 1007,1015 (11th Cir 1998) ("To vacate an arbi-
tration award for evident partiality, the moving party must present evidence that would support
a reasonable impression of partiality on the arbitrator's behalf") (citation omitted); Schmitz v
Zilveti, 20 F3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir 1994) ("'Reasonable impression of partiality'
... is the best expression of the Commonwealth Coatings court's holding.").
120 Merit Insurance, 714 F2d at 681 (indicating that Section 10(a)(2) could be read to dis-
qualify an arbitrator reasonably suspected of partiality).
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under this section, courts have adopted a standard somewhere be-
tween "appearance of bias" and "actual bias," adopting some variation
of a "reasonable impression of bias" standard.
2. Vacatur based on "fundamental unfairness" of the arbitration.
In addition to the statutory grounds for vacatur in Section 10,
some courts have embraced the idea that an award based on an arbi-
tration that was not "fundamentally fair" may be vacated.1 2' Most cir-
cuits take the view that the fundamental fairness test is simply an off-
shoot of the Section 10(a)(3) requirement that the arbitrator be free
from "misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
diced. 'l For example, in Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha and
Convention Center v Union de Tronquistas Local 901,'2 when an arbi-
trator accepted into evidence the trial transcript of a criminal pro-
ceeding related to the arbitration dispute, but then refused to give any
weight to that evidence, the First Circuit held that this refusal justified
vacatur of the arbitration award. ' The court cited Section 10(a)(3)
and concluded that "[v]acatur is appropriate only when the exclusion
of relevant evidence so affects the rights of a party that it may be said
that he was deprived of a fair hearing."' '
One circuit, on the other hand, adopted the fundamental fairness
test as an extra-statutory ground for vacating an arbitration award.
The Tenth Circuit has distinguished vacatur based on fundamental un-
fairness from vacatur based on Section 10, holding that "[a]n arbitra-
tor's decision may be set aside only for reasons stated in the FAA, or
121 See, for example, Bowles Financial Group, Inc v Stifeh Nicolaus & Co, Inc, 22 F3d 1010,
1012-13 (10th Cir 1994) (collecting cases).
122 9USC§10(a)(3).
123 763 F2d 34 (1st Cir 1985).
124 Id at 40.
125 Id (citation omitted). Other courts resting the "fundamental fairness" doctrine on Sec-
tion 10(a) include the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. See BellAerospace
Company Division of Textron, Inc v Local 516, 500 F2d 921, 923 (2d Cir 1974) (interpreting Sec-
tion 10 to require that an arbitrator "need only grant the parties a fundamentally fair hearing");
Newark Stereotypers' Union No 18 v Newark Morning Ledger Co, 397 F2d 594,599 (3d Cir 1968)
(holding that under Section 10(a)(3), an error that requires vacatur of an award "must be one
that.. so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing");
Gallus Investments LP v Pudgie's Famous Chicken, Ltd, 134 F3d 231,234 (4th Cir 1998) (suppos-
ing without deciding that there may exist some situation where an arbitrator's blatant use of evi-
dence "might be so fundamentally unfair as to violate § 10"); Forsythe International, SA v Gibbs
Oil Co, 915 F2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir 1990) (holding that any one of the statutory grounds in Sec-
tion 10 may justify vacatur, but positing the question for review as "whether the arbitration pro-
ceedings were fundamentally unfair"); National Post Office Mailhandlers v United States Postal
Service, 751 F2d 834,841 (6th Cir 1985) (holding that the standard for review of arbitration pro-
ceedings under Section 10(a)(3) is "whether a party to arbitration has been denied a fundamen-
tally fair hearing"); Grahams Service Inc v Teamsters Local 975,700 F2d 420,422 (8th Cir 1982)




for a small number of reasons created by the courts, including awards
... where the arbitrators failed to conduct a fundamentally fair hear-
ing.,,l'6
Regardless of its foundation, a majority of circuits have recog-
nized fundamental unfairness as a ground for vacating an arbitration
award. The basic requirements of fundamental fairness are "notice,
opportunity to be heard and to present relevant and material evidence
and argument before the decision makers, and that the decision mak-
ers are not infected with bias.' 'ln Thus, whether the test is justified as
an interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act or as an extra-
statutory, judicially-created doctrine, most courts recognize that an ar-
bitration award may be vacated if it is the result of a proceeding that
was fundamentally unfair.
3. Justifications for postponing challenges until after arbitration.
Some courts have held that challenges based on "evident partial-
ity" and "fundamental unfairness" must be postponed until after the
arbitration has been completed. '2 This requirement comes in part
from the text of Section 10 of the FAA, which allows a district court to
"make an order vacating the award."' '29 If challenges to arbitration
based on Section 10, such as "evident partiality" and "fundamental un-
fairness" challenges, can only be redressed through vacatur of an
award, they clearly cannot be redressed until after arbitration.n In ad-
dition to this textual argument, postponement makes sense because
any bias will only manifest itself in the actual arbitration.3' Permitting
partiality or unfairness challenges prior to arbitration would open the
126 Keil-Koss v Cigna, 2000 US App LEXIS 8840, *5 (10th Cir). But see Hoffnan v Cargill
Inc, 236 F3d 458,462 (8th Cir 2001) (questioning the use of the fundamental fairness doctrine as
an extra-statutory justification for vacatur).
127 Bowles, 22 F3d at 1013. See also National Boatland, Inc v ITT Commercial Finance Corp,
2000 US App LEXIS 24783, *6 (6th Cir), citing Bowles; Ramirez-de-Arellano v American Air-
lines, Inc, 133 F3d 89, 91 (1st Cir 1997) ("Arbitration proceedings must meet the minimal re-
quirements of fairness-adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by
the arbitrator.") (quotation marks omitted); Sunshine Mining Co v United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, 823 F2d 1289,1295 (9th Cir 1987).
128 See Smith, 233 F3d at 506 (stating that the "time to challenge an arbitration, on whatever
grounds, including bias, is when the arbitration is completed and an award rendered"); Michaels
v Mariforum Shipping, SA, 624 F2d 411,414 n 4 (2d Cir 1980) ("[lIt is well established that a dis-
trict court cannot entertain an attack upon the qualifications or partiality of arbitrators until af-
ter the conclusion of the arbitration and the rendition of an award.').
129 9 USC § 10(a).
130 See Folse v Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp, 56 F3d 603,605 (5th Cir 1995) ("By
its own terms, § 10 authorizes court action only after a final award is made by the arbitrator.")
(emphasis added).
131 See Crim v Pepperidge Farm, Inc, 32 F Supp 2d 326,330 (D Md 1999) (stating that arbi-
trators should be "given a chance to demonstrate that they will participate in the arbitration
process in a fair, honest and good-faith manner") (quotation marks omitted).
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floodgates to litigation in circumstances in which the parties may not
face bias directly."' Such litigation would be time-consuming and po-
tentially fruitless considering the difficulty in showing partiality or un-
fairness absent an award, or at least a proceeding, that reflects such
bias.'"
This type of expensive delay runs "counter to the purpose of the
arbitration process in general, and the Federal Arbitration Act in par-
ticular, which is to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide par-
ties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would be
speedier and less costly than litigation."'"' Additionally, if a district
court entertains a partiality or unfairness challenge prior to arbitra-
tion, it may interfere with the choice made by parties to an arbitration
agreement to "trade off certain procedural safeguards . . .against
hoped-for savings in time and expense.' 35
III. PERMITTING INSTITUTIONAL BIAS CHALLENGES
PRIOR TO ARBITRATION
This Comment proposes that courts should entertain institutional
bias claims prior to arbitration. The FAA clearly indicates that parties
may challenge arbitration agreements on general contract grounds,
and as will be shown, there are legitimate contractual grounds on
which to base institutional bias challenges to arbitration. Further, for
disputes involving statutorily created rights, Supreme Court precedent
involving "effective vindication" provides another basis for launching
an attack on structurally biased arbitration proceedings. Because insti-
tutional bias challenges can be characterized as challenges based on
either contractual grounds or an inability to vindicate statutory rights,
the justifications for allowing those types of challenges to proceed
prior to arbitration'- apply to the institutional bias challenges as well.
The fact that institutional bias underlies the contractual or ineffective
vindication challenge does not change the fundamental nature of the
challenge.
132 See id ("If the parties are allowed to challenge the arbitrator chosen by their opponents
based merely on the appearance of impropriety before [the arbitration] ... then the floodgates to
litigation will be open."); Aviall, Inc v Ryder System, Inc, 913 F Supp 826, 833 (S D NY 1996)
("[A]lowing courts to review before the fact the partiality of arbitrators would spawn endless
litigation."), affd, 110 F3d 892 (2d Cir 1997).
133 See Aviall, 913 F Supp at 833 ("In most cases it is inappropriate and difficult to deter-
mine the partiality of an arbitrator absent an award that reflects alleged bias.").
134 Crim, 32 F Supp 2d at 330 (quotation marks omitted).
135 Smith, 233 F3d at 506 (noting that the right to challenge the arbitral forum on grounds
other than those provided for by the FAA was one of the procedural rights given up by plaintiff
when she agreed to the arbitration clause).
136 See Part II.A.3.
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Both of these methods-basing an institutional bias challenge on
either a contractual or ineffective vindication claim-allow parties to
avoid arbitration to which they ostensibly agreed to submit disputes.
This apparently runs counter to the "national policy favoring arbitra-
tion,"" which encourages disputes to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. However, it is not clear that post-arbitration court proceedings
would be able to address institutional bias challenges sufficiently.
A. Institutional Bias Challenges Based on General
Contract Principles
Contract grounds for challenging arbitration agreements prior to
arbitration are well-suited for application to charges of institutional
bias. Consider a claim of unconscionability. In Indiana, for example, a
claim of unconscionability requires that there was a great disparity in
bargaining power that led the weaker party to sign the contract
unwillingly or unaware of its terms, and that the contract was "such
that no sensible man not under delusion, duress, or in distress would
make [it], and such as no honest and fair man would accept [it]. ' ' s It is
easy to imagine a situation in which an arbitration agreement creates
a process or chooses a forum that is institutionally biased against one
party such that no sensible person in that party's situation would
agree to the arbitration. If there exists great disparity in the bargain-
ing strength of two parties whereby one party is forced to accept the
arbitration that is biased against it, the agreement arguably could be
considered unconscionable.'" If a party understood the bias at the
time of entering the agreement it should not be allowed to argue un-
conscionability,'40 but a party should not be bound to arbitrate in a fo-
rum, the inherent bias of which it was unaware.
Lack of consideration may also be a valid contract principle on
which to rest an institutional bias challenge. Generally, one party's
promise to submit disputes to arbitration can serve as consideration
for the other party's promise to do the same.4' However, if the arbitra-
137 Southland Corp v Keating, 465 US 1,10 (1984).
138 Geiger v Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, 134 F Supp 2d 985,997 (S D Ind 2001), citing
Weaver v American Oil Co, 257 Ind 458,276 NE2d 144,146 (1971).
139 See, for example, Geiger, 134 F Supp 2d at 999-1001 (holding that a high school graduate
seeking a job at a restaurant could not understand or formulate questions about the arbitration
procedure to which she was binding herself and which the court found structurally biased in the
restaurant's favor).
140 See, for example, Woods v Saturn Distribution Corp, 78 F3d 424,428 (9th Cir 1996) (re-
jecting an unconscionability claim where, at the time of signing an arbitration agreement, the
party understood the arbitration procedure and the relationship of arbitrators to the other
party).
141 See, for example, Matterhorn, Inc v NCR Corp, 763 F2d 866, 869 (7th Cir 1985) ("If the
agreement of one party to arbitrate disputes is fully supported by the other party's agreement to
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tion is heavily biased in favor of one party, it is as if that party is giving
up nothing in exchange for the other party's promise.
Two circuit courts have recently upheld a similar argument. 2 In
these cases, the finding of lack of consideration was based on the fact
that one party had the ability to modify the arbitration rules and pro-
cedures unilaterally without notification or consent of the other
party.'3 There is little functional difference between an arbitral forum
that is systematically biased in favor of one party by its nature and an
arbitral forum that can be made that way through the unilateral action
of that party.'"
Therefore, if a party's promise to arbitrate in a forum that it can
change unilaterally to favor it is not consideration, and this is func-
tionally equivalent to a party's promise to arbitrate in a forum that is
already institutionally biased in its favor, then a party's promise to ar-
bitrate in the latter forum is not consideration. Lack of consideration
based on institutional bias is thus a legitimate contractual ground on
which to challenge an arbitration agreement.
B. Institutional Bias Challenges Based on Inability to Vindicate
Statutory Rights
With respect to arbitration of claims involving statutory rights,
such as Title VII or civil RICO claims, the "effective vindication" line
of cases provides a solid legal basis for institutional bias challenges
prior to arbitration proceedings.'5 With respect to arbitration of statu-
do likewise, there is no need to look elsewhere in the contract for consideration for the agree-
ment to arbitrate.").
142 See Penn v Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, 269 F3d 753,759-60 (7th Cir 2001) (finding
a lack of consideration in an arbitration agreement where the party providing the arbitral forum
had unfettered discretion in choosing the nature of that forum); Floss, 211 F3d at 315-16 (same).
143 See Penn, 269 F3d at 759-60; Floss, 211 F3d at 315-16.
144 Any difference between the two scenarios seems to rest on the difference between the
contract doctrines of nominal consideration and illusory promise. Penn and Floss invalidated ar-
bitration agreements based on an illusory promise: The employer/arbitrator's ability to choose
the fundamental nature of the arbitration forum made its promise to submit to arbitration illu-
sory. See Penn, 269 F3d at 760 ("[T]he EDS Ryan's contract [ ] does nothing to limit EDS's abil-
ity to amend its procedures, reinforcing our opinion that its promise to Penn is unenforceable
and illusory."); Floss, 211 F3d at 316 ("EDSI's right to choose the nature of its performance ren-
ders its promise illusory."). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 (1979) (stating that
"[a] promise ... is not consideration if by its terms the promisor ... reserves a choice of alterna-
tive performances"). Agreement to submit to arbitration that is institutionally biased in one's fa-
vor would technically not be considered an illusory promise because the promisor does not re-
tain a choice over the nature of its performance. However, if a party is nearly assured of prevail-
ing in arbitration, its promise to submit to arbitration in exchange for another party's promise to
submit is functionally worthless. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, comment b ("[A]
mere pretense of bargain does not suffice [to create a contract], as ... where the purported con-
sideration is merely nominal."). Though nominal consideration is not technically the same as illu-
sory promise, both fall under the general rubric of lack of consideration.
145 See Part II.A.2.
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tory rights, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts should refuse
to compel arbitration when parties will not be able to vindicate their
statutory rights effectively.'" Various circuit courts have held that
agreements explicitly limiting the types or amounts of remedies avail-
able to parties to arbitration do not allow effective vindication of
statutory rights.47 It is a small step to hold that an arbitration that is
inherently biased against a party asserting statutory claims also does
not allow for the effective vindication of those claims. There is little
relevant difference between an arbitration agreement that explicitly
states that an arbitrator cannot award exemplary damages and an ar-
bitration agreement that says nothing about exemplary damages, but
submits disputes to a forum that in practice never awards them.
C. Insufficiency of Post-Arbitration Challenges to Address
Institutional Bias
The two post-arbitration challenges that are potentially applica-
ble to institutional bias challenges are measured by the "evident parti-
ality"' and "fundamental unfairness."' standards. One could argue
that an institutional bias challenge is similar enough to these post-
arbitration challenges that it too should be heard only after an arbitra-
tion is complete. Further examination of the "evident partiality" and
"fundamental unfairness" challenges, however, shows that neither
would provide an adequate remedy for victims of institutional bias.
First, while the "evident partiality" standard may be sufficient to
challenge bias of individual arbitrators, it is not clear that such a stan-
dard would allow remedy of certain structural biases. For a court to
vacate an award for "evident partiality," a party must allege partiality
that is "direct, definite, and capable of demonstration."''50 To demon-
strate direct and definite partiality, a plaintiff must show "specific
facts" evidencing that an award was tainted by the arbitrators' partial-
ity.'"' The problem with trying to use the "evident partiality" remedy
for challenging the institutional biases of an arbitration forum is that
many types of structural bias will never result in specific facts showing
that an individual arbitrator was partial.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See Part H.B.1.
149 See Part II.B.2.
150 Andersons; Inc v Horton Farms, Inc, 166 F3d 308, 329 (6th Cir 1998). See also Harter v
Jowa Grain Co, 220 F3d 544, 553 (7th Cir 2000) ("We have stated that 'evident partiality' exists
when an arbitrator's bias is direct, definite and capable of demonstration rather than remote, un-
certain, or speculative.") (quotation marks omitted); Scott v Prudential Securities, Inc, 141 F3d
1007,1015 (11th Cir 1998).
151 Andersons, 166 F3d at 329.
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For example, the Geist study of ICANN's dispute resolution sys-
tem found that there are two types of arbitrators: those who strictly in-
terpret ICANN rules, and those who take a more liberal approach to
the rules."2 None of these arbitrators may exhibit evident partiality on
an individual basis. Strict interpretation of the rules may favor trade-
mark holders while looser interpretation may favor domain name
registrants, but an arbitrator may not be biased toward one party
simply because he favors one interpretive philosophy over the other.
Under these circumstances, no "specific facts" evidencing arbitrator
partiality could be alleged. However, if the organization providing the
arbitration consistently assigns arbitrators favoring strict
interpretation when it claims to assign arbitrators randomly,n the
arbitration may be seriously biased against one party. This type of bias
would not be addressed sufficiently by an evident partiality standard
that looked solely to the bias of individual arbitrators and ignored less
concrete forms of bias diffused throughout the entire arbitral system.
Indeed, institutional bias challenges made in the form of motions
to vacate for evident partiality have not met with much success.'m Be-
cause evident partiality has been interpreted to mean something be-
yond a mere appearance of bias,"5 the inability of some types of struc-
tural bias, such as the ICANN bias described above, to evidence "spe-
cific facts" of actual bias in any particular case leaves such structural
bias outside the reach of vacatur based on evident partiality.n
Similarly, a "fundamental unfairness" inquiry appears insufficient
to address concerns of institutional bias after arbitration. The fact that
fundamental fairness requires "notice, opportunity to be heard and
present relevant and material evidence and argument before the deci-
sion makers, and that the decision makers are not infected with bias'"
implies that relief could be granted following arbitrations in which in-
stitutional bias resulted in an unfavorable award. However, the "fun-
damental unfairness" approach suffers from the same shortcomings as
the "evident partiality" approach with respect to institutional bias.
Here too the problem arises in situations such as the ICANN example
152 Geist, How Bias Besets Domain Cases, The Globe and Mail at B12 (cited in note 30).
153 See note 35.
154 See, for example, Harter, 220 F3d at 555-57 (holding that allegations of institutional bias
in the NGFA, even if true, would not establish the direct, definite bias required for vacatur under
evident partiality provision); Andersons, 166 F3d at 329-30 (refusing to vacate arbitration award
despite allegations of "systemic defects" in NGFA arbitration proceedings).
155 See Part II.B.1.
156 See Andersons, 166 F3d at 329 ("[T]he party seeking invalidation must demonstrate
more than an amorphous institutional predisposition toward the other side; a lesser showing
would be tantamount to an 'appearance of bias' standard.").
157 Bowles Financial Group, Inc v Stifel, Nicolaus & Co, Inc, 22 F3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir
1994). See also note 127 and accompanying text.
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in which institutional bias is diffused through higher levels rather than
the individual arbitrators. To the extent that "fundamental unfairness"
is simply an offshoot of the Section 10(a)(3) requirement that arbitra-
tors be free from misconduct or other misbehavior,'- it will not ad-
dress bias that is not directly manifested in the actions or behavior of
individual arbitrators.
Further, even the Tenth Circuit, which considers the "fundamen-
tal fairness" doctrine outside the statutory boundaries of Section
10(a)(3), has been reluctant to declare an arbitral forum fundamen-
tally unfair where, although the arbitration rules may create an unfair
system, there is no specific violation of those rules by the arbitrators
or the parties.'"
Again, the Tenth Circuit's "fundamental unfairness" approach
would fail to address the ICANN bias at levels higher than the indi-
vidual arbitrator. The justifications for postponing "evident partiality"
and "fundamental unfairness" challenges simply do not apply to insti-
tutional bias challenges. Because the former challenges require show-
ings of partiality or unfairness in the actual arbitration, it is only logi-
cal that an arbitration must have taken place. But as the ICANN ex-
ample illustrates, institutional bias may be present and have adverse
effects on one party without the bias ever manifesting itself in a di-
rectly observable event in the arbitration. Thus, delaying an institu-
tional bias challenge until the proceeding is complete may add no new
evidence.
Thus, the two approaches for post-arbitration vacatur that at first
glance appear most helpful in providing relief for systemically biased
arbitration proceedings- "evident partiality" and "fundamental un-
fairness"-seem insufficient to remedy such bias. Both approaches
may address bias at the level of individual arbitrators, but fail to ad-
dress bias one step removed at the institutional level.
CONCLUSION
Charges of institutional bias have been leveled against various
arbitration organizations. When a party who has signed a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is faced with the specter of being forced to arbi-
trate a dispute in a forum that is biased against it, that party may wish
to seek relief from a federal district court. Allegations of institutional
bias may seem no different from charges of evident partiality or fun-
158 See note 122 and accompanying text.
159 See, for example, Bowles, 22 F3d at 1013-14 (holding that an aggrieved party had not
proven that it was subjected to a fundamentally unfair hearing where opposing counsel had
seemingly improper contact with the arbitrators, but where such contact-was not expressly pro-
hibited by the broad procedural rules of the arbitration).
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damental unfairness, thus requiring delay until after arbitration before
such allegations may be raised in court. However, this Comment
points out important differences between these types of challenges,
and further proposes that institutional bias claims map well with ei-
ther contractual claims or claims of inability to vindicate statutory
rights effectively. Thus, such challenges may be raised before the party
is forced to submit to the allegedly biased arbitration proceedings.
